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CLEANSING THE AUGEAN STABLES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT
TRENDS IN THE PLEA BARGAINING
DEBATE IN CANADA
By SIMON N. VERDUN-JONES* and F. DOUGLAS COUSINEAU**
We have previously recognized plea bargaining as an ineradicable fact. Failure to
recognize it tends not to destroy it but to drive it underground. We reiterate what
we have said before: that when plea bargaining occurs it ought to be spread on
the record ... and publicly disclosed.'
[P]Iea-bargaining, is something2 for which a decent criminal justice system has, no
place. There has to be a trial.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a veritable flood of literature on the subject of plea bargaining in Canada. A similar enthusiasm for the topic is
discernible in the literature of other common law jurisdictions such as the
I.
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1 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Rule 11, 18
U.S.C.A. at 24.
2 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Fourth Annual Report (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974-75) at 14.
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United States and England. 3 Responses to these publications, which have

brought plea bargaining to the forefront of debate over the future of the
criminal justice system, have been sharply divergent. For example, the
United States Supreme Court4 and Congress 5 recently have bestowed the
mantles of respectability and legitimacy upon the practice of prosecutorial
plea bargaining, while the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals has condemned the practice in unequivocal terms."
Similarly, in Canada, while the Canadian Bar Association appears to recognize the propriety of the practice,7 both the Canadian' and Ontario Law
3 In addition to the sources cited infra, see, in Canada, Parker, Copping a Plea, [19721
Chitty's L.J. 310; EditorialNote (1970), 12 Crim. L.Q. 245; Letter to the Editor (1971),
19 Chitty's L.J. 110; Martin, The Role and Responsibility of the Defence Advocate
(1970), 12 Crim. L.Q. 376 at 389-90; Klein, Habitual Offender Legislation and the
Bargaining Process (1973), 15 Crim. L.Q. 417; Ducros, "The Role of the Trial Judge
in the Criminal Process," in Canadian Bar Association, Studies in Criminal Law and
Procedure (Ottawa: C.B.A., 1973) 1 at 4-5; Hoolihan, "Ethical Standards for Defenco
Counsel." in id. at 124; Editoial (1976), 25 Chitty's L.J. 78; Grosman, Letter to The Globe
and Mail, April 12, 1976 at 7; and Tepperman, Crime Control: The Urge Tovard
Authority (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977) at 79-84; in the United States,
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining (1975), 84 Yale L.J. 1179;
Bond, Plea Bargainingand Guilty Pleas (New York: Clark Boardman Co., 1975); Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations:A Study of Bargain Justice (1956), 46 J. Crim.
L., Criminology & Pol. Sci. 78; Note, Guilty Plea Bargains: Compromises by Prosecutors
to Secure Guilty Pleas (1964), 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865; Skolnick, Social Control in the
Adversary System (1967), 11 J. of Conflict Res. 52; White, A Proposal for Reformn of
the Plea Bargaining Process (1971), 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439; Goldstein, For Harold
Lasswell; Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent and the
Plea Bargain (1975), 84 Yale L.J. 683; and Rosett and Cressey, Justice by Consent:
Plea Bargains in the American Courthouse (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976); and in
England, Thomas, An Exploration of Plea Bargaining, [1969] Crim. L. Rev. 59; White,
Newark and Samuels, Offences Taken Into Consideration, [1970] Crim. L. Rev. 311;
Thomas, Plea Bargainingand the Turner Case, [1970] Crim. L. Rev. 559; Davis, Sentences for Sale: A New Look at Plea Bargaining in England and America, [1971] Crim.
L. Rev. 150 at 218; Adams, The Second Ethical Problem in R. v. Turner: The Limits of
an Advocate's Discretion, [1971] Crim. L. Rev. 252; Purves, That Plea Bargaining Business: Some Conclusions From Research, [1971] Crim. L. Rev. 470; Samuels, Tile Guilty
Plea and Sentencing: Proposed Improvements, [1971] Sol. J. 120; Thomas, The Judicial
Approach to Plea Bargaining (1972), 5 Man. L.J. 201; Cooper, Plea Bargaining: A
Comparative Analysis (1972), 5 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 427 at 434 ff.; Bottom,
ley, Decisions in the Penal Process (London: Martin Robertson, 1973) at 105 if.;
Bottoms and McClean, Defendants in the Criminal Process (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1976); Heberling, Conviction without Trial (1973), 2 Anglo-American L. Rev.
428; and Seifman, The Plea Bargaining Process: Trial by Error? (1977), 127 New
L.J. 551.
4 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971).
5 See Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Also see the submissions
of the Supreme Court to the Congress in relation to the amended Rule 11 as discussed
in Brand, Revised Federal Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in Criminal Cases
(1976), 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1010.
6
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Courts
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973) at 42-65. See Standard 3.1.
7 Canadian Bar Association, Code of ProfessionalConduct (Ottawa: C.B.A., 1974),
chap. VIII, "The Lawyer as Advocate," Commentary No. 10, at 30-31.
8 Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 2, at 14. Also see Criminal Procedure: Control of the Process, Working Paper No. 15 (Ottawa: Information Canada,
1975) at 44-47.
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Reform Commissionsu have contended that plea bargaining is highly improper
and that it should be abolished. Quite clearly, strong positions have been
taken as to the propriety of plea bargaining, even though our knowledge
about the phenomenon is extremely limited. Unfortunately, very little of the
voluminous literature contributes to a clarification of the critical issues raised
by the practice of plea bargaining. It is submitted that the quality of the
debate on plea bargaining would be enhanced immeasurably were more
attention paid to the fruits of empirical research. While empirical investigations cannot furnish ready-made solutions to the problems raised by plea
bargaining, they can at least provide a basis upon which major policy decisions could be reached with some advertence to the practical effects of
implementing such decisions.
In 1974, the Canadian Bar Review published a very influential article
by Gerald Ferguson and Darryl Roberts,' 0 whose analysis of the issues
raised by plea bargaining effectively *prompted the Law Reform Commission
of Canada to adopt an "abolitionist" stance. Although the article was clearly
one of the most thorough and comprehensive reviews of the relevant issues,
the authors were unable to relate their analysis to any significant body of
empirical research dealing with plea bargaining as it is practised in Canada.'1
Furthermore, they did not conceive of their task as including a systematic
review of the extensive research literature published in the United States.
Since the Ferguson and Roberts article appeared, the findings of at least four
significant studies of plea bargaining in Canada have been published.' 2 In
addition, the American literature has been enriched considerably in recent
years by the publication of some critical studies dealing with issues that
13
are at the very core of the controversy surrounding plea bargaining.
9 Law Reform Commission of Ontario, Report on Administration of Ontario Courts,

Part 11 (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1973) at 119-25.
10 Ferguson and Roberts, Plea Bargaining:Directions for Canadian Reform (1974),

52 Can. B. Rev. 498.
11 Ferguson and Roberts were aware of both the importance and lack of empirical
research. See text accompanying note 110, infra.
12 See Klein, Let's Make a Deal: Negotiating Justice (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1976);
Hartnagel, Plea Negotiations in Canada (1975), 17 Can. J. Crim. & Corr. 45; Wynne
and Hartnagel, Race and Plea Negotiations: An Analysis of Some Canadian Data
(1975), 1 Can. J. Soc. 147; and Hagan, Parameters of Criminal Prosecution: An Application of Path Analysis to a Problem of Criminal Justice (1975), 65 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 536.
13 See, for example, Georgetown University Law Center, Plea Bargaining in the
United States, Phase I Report (Washington: n. pub., 1977); Gillespie, Judicial Productivity and Court Delay: An Exploratory Analysis of the Federal District Courts (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1977); Nimmer and Krauthaus, Plea Bargaining: Reform
in Two Cities (1977), 3 Justice System J. 6; Eisenstein and Jacob, Felony Justice: An
Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Mather,

Some Determinants of the Method of Case Disposition: Decision-Making by Public
Defenders in Los Angeles (1973), 8 Law & Society Rev. 187; Note, The Elimination of

Plea Bargaining in Black Hawk County: A Case Study (1975), 60 Iowa L. Rev. 1053;
Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargainingand Case Pressure (1975), 9 Law & Society Rev.
515; Church, PleaBargains, Concessions and the Courts:Analysis of a Quasi-Experiment
(1976), 10 Law & Society Rev. 377; Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining (1976),
62 A.B.A.J. 621; Heumann, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors,Judges and
Defense Attorneys (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Utz, Settling the Facts:

Discretion and Negotiation in Criminal Court (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1978); and

230
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The purposes of this article are, first, to undertake a systematic review
of the legal approaches to plea bargaining in Canada and the United States,
with particular reference to recent developments of great significance; second,
to examine the recent proposals for the reform of plea bargaining within the
two jurisdictions; third, to investigate the extent and nature of plea bargaining in Canada; and fourth, to evaluate the proposal of the Law Reform
Commission of Canada to abolish plea bargaining in the light of empirical
research undertaken in both Canada and the United States.
II.

PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIAL
AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

The last century has witnessed a series of dramatic changes in the
approach of the American courts to prosecutorial plea bargaining. In the
latter half of the 19th century, it appears that the courts treated plea bargaining as an "essentially immoral" practice, and attempted to suppress it.14
By the early 1920's, significant changes in the courts' approach had taken
place. While the legal profession as a whole continued to condemn the
practice as being contrary to principle, 15 there is nevertheless sufficient contemporary evidence to suggest that plea bargaining in fact occurred to a
significant extent. 16 In order to reconcile the overriding principle that justice
should not be the subject of bargaining with the realities of everyday practice, the response of the courts was to permit plea bargaining to flourish while
studiously ignoring its existence at an official level. 17 Writing in 1932,
Thurman Arnold pointed to the stark contrast between the principle that
Buckle and Buckle, Bargainingfor Justice: Case Disposition and Reform in the Criminal
Courts (New York: Praeger, 1977).
14 See Golden v. State, 49 Ind. 424 at 427 (Cir. Ct. 1875); and Wight v. Rindskopf,
43 Wis. 344 at 355 (S. Ct. 1877). In the former case, the Court compared plea bargaining
to "corruptly purchasing an indulgence," while, in the latter, an attorney's promise to
negotiate a plea with the prosecutor was denounced as "essentially immoral," and against
public policy. These cases are cited in Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining:
Remedies for Broken Promises (1973), 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 771 at 771, n. 4.
15 See Pound, Criminal Justice in America (New York: H. Holt, 1930) at 184;
Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution (New York: Arno, 1974 reprint of Minton,
Balch, 1929); Illinois Association for Criminal Justice, The Illinois Crime Survey (Montclair, N.J.: Patterson-Smith, 1929); and Missouri Association for Criminal Justice, Missouri
Crime Survey (Montclair, N.J.: Patterson-Smith, 1926). Also see Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining (1968), 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50 at 51.
16 See, for example, Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection
(1932), 42 Yale L.J. 1 passim; Molen, The Vanishing Jury (1928), 2 S. Cal. L. Rev.
97 at 97-127; Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases (1927), 1 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1;
and Baker, The Prosecutor-The Initiation of Prosecution (1933), 23 J. Crim. L.,
Criminology & Pol. Sci. 779.
17 Kadish and Kadish, Justified Rule Departures by Officials (1971), 59 Cal. L. Rev.
905 at.944-45. Newman documents the existence of the courtroom charade in which
the judge asks the defendant entering a plea of guilty whether anyone had made promises
or inducements to influence him to plead guilty. The appropriately coached defendant
replied that no such promises or inducements had been made even though all the participants in the ritual (even the judge himself) knew that in fact the opposite was the case.
See Newman, Conviction: The Determinants of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966) at 7 and 76 ff. Newman indicates that the approach of the
courts varied somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Also see U.S. v. Williams, 407
F. 2d 940 at 947, n. 11 (4th Cir. 1969); and U.S. v. Jackson, 390 F. 2d 130 at 138
(7th Cir. 1968), cited in Kadish and Kadish, op. cit., at 945, n. 122.
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placed plea bargaining beyond the pale, on the one hand, and the widespread
incidence of the practice, on the other.
Probably the difficulty with our compromise system and the technique of obtaining
guilty pleas today lies in the necessity of explaining it away and in the fact that
concealed practices have a bad odor. In civil cases we find compromises actually
encouraged as a more satisfactory method of settling disputes between individuals
than an actual trial. However, if the dispute (even though it is actually only a
quarrel between individuals) finds itself in the field of criminal law, "Law Enforcement" repudiates the idea of compromise as immoral, or as at best a necessary
evil. The "State" can never compromise. It must "enforce the law". Therefore open
methods of compromise are impossible. 18

In recent years, the courts have reversed their policy of officially ignoring the practice of plea bargaining and have taken it out of the closet. In
1967, both the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 0 and the American Bar Association Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice20 advocated that the negotiated plea should be recognized as a legitimate process provided that it be brought under strict regulation. Shortly thereafter, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in delivering the opinion of the Court in the case of Santobello v.
New York, contended that:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of
the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.
It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids
much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those
accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on
pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it
enhances whatever may2 be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are
ultimately imprisoned. 1
18Arnold, supra note 16, at 19.
19 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Task Force Report: The Courts (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967)
at 9-13.
20 A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating
to Pleas of Guilty (tent. draft, 1969) at 45. The draft was approved with minor revisions in February, 1968. In 1973 the Standards were amended. For further discussion
of the A.B.A. Standards, see Rotenberg, The Progress of Plea Bargains: The A.B.A.
Standards and Beyond (1975), 8 Conn. L. Rev. 44.
21 Supra note 4, at 260-61 (U.S.), 498 (S. Ct.). It should be noted that the Chief
Justice disapproved of the use of the term "plea bargaining." He emphasized instead the
notion of "plea agreements," which follow "plea discussions." The intention of the Chief
Justice appears to have been to ensure that the parties to any plea agreement should
understand fully that they cannot fetter the trial court's freedom of action. This principle
is underscored strongly in the recently amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trend toward recognition and approval of plea bargaining dates
back to the case of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970). The
position of the U.S. Supreme Court is fully discussed in Conlyn, The Supreme Court's
Changed View of the Guilty Plea (1973-74), 4 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 79; and Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The Defense Attorney and the Guilty Plea (1975), 47 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1. At about the same time, some state supreme courts began to adopt an
approach similar to that maintained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Santobello. See, for
example, People v. West, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P. 2d 409 (1970). See, generally, Green,
Ward and Arcuri, Plea Bargaining: Fairness and Inadequacy of Representation (197576), 7 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 495 at 498-500.
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Subsequently, both the American Law Institute 22 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law23 have promulgated standards that recognize the legitimacy of the negotiated plea while submitting it
to strict judicial scrutiny. The only major national body to advocate the
complete abolition of plea bargaining has been the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. 24 Furthermore, most
academic and professional commentators appear to accept the legitimacy of
the practice while they still press for adequate safeguards to protect the
interests of accused persons.2 5 At least as far as the federal courts are conrecent amendments
cerned, these remarkable developments culminated in the
20
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 11 recognizes that the negotiated plea is a perfectly legitimate
procedure within the pre-trial process. The gist of the rule is the requirement
that any plea agreement reached between the defence and the prosecution
must be disclosed to the trial judge-usually in open court.27 At this stage,
the trial court judge may decide to accept or reject the agreement; alternatively, he may decide to defer his decision until he has had occasion to
consider a pre-sentence report.2 8 If a court decides to accept the plea agreement, the judgment and sentence handed down must embody the disposition and sentence contemplated by the agreement. On the other hand, if
the trial judge decides to reject the plea agreement, he must inform the
parties of this fact and grant the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his
plea. Furthermore, the judge must inform the defendant that if he persists in
his decision to enter a plea of guilty the ultimate disposition of the case may
22A

350.

2

Model Code of Pre-ArraignmentProcedure (Philadelphia: A.L.I., 1975) art.

SUniform Rules of CriminalProcedure: Model Penal Code (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Pub., 1974) rules 441-44.
24 Supra note 6. The Commission recommended that plea negotiation should be
abolished by no later than 1978. A set of standards was drawn up for the regulation
of plea negotiation in the interim (at 42-65). For a critique of the Commission's recommendations, see Cahalan, Comments on the Court's Task Force Report (1973), 9 Prosecutor 125.
25See Newman and NeMoyer, Issues of Propriety in Negotiated Justice (1970),
47 Denver L.J. 367; Note, Official Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for
the Market Place (1964), 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 167; Enker, "Perspectives on Plea Bargaining," in President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Task Force Report: The Courts, supra note 19, at 108-19, Appendix A; Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain (1972), 82 Yale L.J. 286; and Wheatley, Plea Bargaining: A
Case for Its Continuance (1974), 59 Mass. L.Q. 31. Nevertheless, there remain a
minority of commentators who urge the abolition of plea bargaining. See, for example,
Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society (1971), 46
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 653 at 663 if; Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining (1970),
83 Harv. L. Rev. 1387; Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea (1976), 86
Ethics26 93; and Dean, The Illegitimacy of Plea Bargaining (1974), 38 Fed. Prob. 18.
Supra note 1. Also see Brand, supra note 5. In general, the legislation embodies
many of the substantial principles defined by the A.B.A., the A.L.I., and the Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
27 Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Rule 11(e) (2). Contrary to the recommendations of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Congress added a provision
that provides for disclosure of such an agreement to be made in camera upon a "showing
of good
cause."
2
8Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Rule 11(e)(2), (3), (4).
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turn out to be less favourable to the defendant than the sentence and disposition contemplated by the plea agreement. A critical element in the
amendment to Rule 11 is the provision that limits the courses of action open
to the prosecution in the negotiations leading to a plea agreement. As a result

of the amendments, the government attorney may offer only three types of
concession in exchange for the entry of a guilty plea. He may:
(A) move for dismissal
agree not to oppose the
understanding that such
the court;29 or (C) agree
the case.

of other charges; or (B) make a recommendation, or
defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the
recommendation or request shall not be binding upon
that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of

While Rule 11 absolutely forbids the trial judge from participation in
any plea discussions,3" it assigns the court an extremely active role once it
has been informed that a plea agreement has been reached. The Rule specifies
a series of questions that the judge must address to the defendant personally
in order to determine if the latter fully understands the implications and
the plea is entirely
consequences of pleading guilty, 31 if he understands that 33
voluntary, 2 and that there is a factual basis for the plea.
Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Rule II(e) (I).
.0 Id.
3' Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Rule 11 (c):
(c) Advice to Defendant.
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the
defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he
understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right
to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and,
if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it
has already been made, and he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial
has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself;
and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the
right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later
be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
32 Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Rule 11(d). Some of the Supreme Court's criteria for
determining the voluntariness of the plea of not guilty are stated clearly in Brady v.
United States, supra note 21. Also see Bond, Plea Bargaining-A Case Note (1977), 3
Justice System J. 58. An important question when considering the voluntariness of the
plea is the extent to which the courts will investigate the competence of counsel who
advised his client to plead guilty. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea
Bargaining: What is the Standard? (1973), 12 Duquesne L. Rev. 321. Also see Barkai,
Accuracy Inquiries for all Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent
Defendants? (1977), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 88.
33 Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Rule 11(f). This provision substantially modified the position of the U.S. Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct.
160 (1970).
29
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The amended Rule 11 represents a significant shift away from the traditional adversarial model in which substantive issues relating to guilt or innocence are determined in the process of a full trial, and in which the judge
assumes the role of a relatively impassive arbitrator between defence and
government counsel. More specifically, the rule legitimizes the system of
everyday practice in which the majority of findings of guilt are reached
without the formalities of a full trial and, in a novel development, it forces
the trial judge to ensure that the interests of both the state and the defendant
are protected adequately during the process of reaching a plea agreement.
In effect, American criminal procedure, insofar as it relates to the guilty
plea in the federal courts, is assuming an increasingly inquisitorial dimension. 34 It is significant that recent commentators have advocated that the
judiciary adopt an even more inquisitorial role.-' Indeed, it has been suggested
that a magistrate or judge should be involved in pre-trial plea conferences
in which issues such as pre-trial discovery could be dealt with in addition
to matters relating to plea agreements.3 6 Such a development would render
the role of the American judiciary not unlike that played by their civil law
counterparts.
It remains to be seen whether the new Rule 11 will find acceptance
in the state courts.3 7 It is not inconceivable, of course, that the federal courts
will hold that the essential principle underlying the Rule must in fact be

34 Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure (1974), 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1009. It must be noted that the pre-trial
process nevertheless retains some of the essential elements of the adversarial system.
The trial judge plays no part in the process by which plea agreements are reached. Although he may reject an agreement, he has no freedom to interfere with the provision
of an agreement that he has decided to accept. In effect, he may accept an agreement
in tota, or reject it out of hand; there are no alternatives between these two courses
of action.
35Note, Plea Bargains and the Transformation of the Criminal Process (1977),
90 Harv. L. Rev. 564; Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, supra note 25; Alschuler,
The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part One (1976), 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1059
esp. at 1122 ff.
36Note, The Preliminary Hearing in California: Adaptive Procedures in a Plea
BargainingSystem of Criminal Justice (1976), 28 Stan. L. Rev. 1207.
37 Some state legislatures have, enacted statutory provisions that closely resemble

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure before it was amended. Alaska,
Hawaii and Washington are examples of this trend. See Bishop, Guilty Pleas in the
Pacific North West (1973), 51 J. Urban L. 170. In California, the legislature enacted
provisions that indicated a growing recognition and approval of plea bargaining, and
that to a large extent adopted the requirements of Rule 11 into California criminal
practice. These statutory provisions relate only to the entry of guilty pleas to lesser
included offences, or to specify the sentence upon which a guilty plea is conditional.
However, the California Supreme Court has held that these statutory provisions may
also serve as guidelines for plea agreements concerning pleas to lesser offences. See
People v. West, supra note 21. See, generally, Comment, An Offer You Can't Refuse:
The Current State of Plea Bargaining in California (1976), 7 Pacific L.J. 80; and Comment, Judicial Supervision of a California Plea Bargain: Regulating the Trade (1971),

59 Cal. L. Rev. 962. Other states have no legislation that regulates the administration
of plea bargaining, and the courts in some of these states do not appear to have applied
rules of practice that reflect the provisions of Rule 11. See, for example, Note, Withdrawal of Pleas in Nebraska: The Rejected Plea Bargain (1977), 56 Neb. L. Rev. 193.
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applied by state courts on the basis that they are required by the federal
Bill of Rights. 38
In sum, there have been at least four phases in the development of the
modem approach to plea bargaining in the United States: a period in which
the courts branded the practice as immoral and actively attempted to eradicate it, a period in which plea bargaining appears to have flourished while
the courts studiously ignored its existence-on the basis that plea bargaining
was considered to be a necessary evil that had to be endured despite its
flagrant contradiction of accepted principles, a stage in which the existence
of plea bargaining was recognized publicly by commentators and learned
commissions, and, finally, a period when the courts recognized the legitimacy
of plea bargaining within the criminal justice process and, hand in hand with
the legislature, have attempted to subject the practice to strict regulation.
III. PLEA BARGAINING IN CANADA: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
It appears that plea bargaining has existed in Canada for a considerable
period of time-albeit to a completely unknown extent.:a9 Nevertheless, there
are very few cases in which Canadian courts have expressed a view as to the
merits or propriety of prosecutorial plea bargaining. Such studious taciturnity
is somewhat enigmatic, given the fact that there are many decided cases in
which even the briefest glance at the report indicates that some sort of bargain
must have been struck between Crown and defence counsel. 40 Yet, as Ferof the
guson remarks, "the Courts have not even inquired into the 4existence
1
bargain, let alone whether bargains may properly be made."
Perhaps the dearth of judicial comment as to the propriety of plea
bargaining stems in part from the deep-seated reluctance of the courts to
interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion-an area traditionally
regarded as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal and provincial attorneys general. 42 The general approach of the courts is perhaps best
38

In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 at 247, 89 S.Ct. 1709 at 1714 (1969),
Harlan J. in dissent argued that his colleagues effectively had made the procedures of
Rule 11 (as it then was) "substantially applicable to the States as a matter of federal
constitutional due process." See, generally, Comment, An Offer You Can't Refuse: The

Current State of Plea Bargainingin California, id. at 90-92.
39 See R. v. Ah Tom (1928), 60 N.S.R. 1, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 748, 49 C.C.C. 204
(C.A.); and R. v. Stone (1932), 4 M.P.R. 455, 58 C.C.C. 262 (N.S.S.C.). Only in the

latter case was any comment made as to the propriety of prosecutorial plea bargaining,
and even then the comment was extremely mild: "It may be that the bargain could not
properly be made; but it was made, and was broken." (at 462 (M.P.R.), 267 (C.C.C.)
per Graham J.).

40 See, for example, the cases cited in Ferguson, The Role of the Judge in Plea

Bargaining (1973), 15 Crim. L. Q. 26 at 27, n. 8.
41 Id.
42 See, generally, Klein, Plea Bargaining (1972), 14 Crim. L.Q. 289 esp. at 294;
and Grosman, The Role of the Prosecutor in Canada (1970), 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 498.

For a sceptical view of the actual extent to which the Attorney General can control the
activities of his agents, and to which his responsibility to the legislature is a safeguard

for the public interest, see Chasse, Annotation; Abuse of process as a control of pro-

secutorial discretion (1970), 10 C.R.N.S. 392. Also see Cohen, Due Process of Law;
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illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Smylhe v.
The Queen, where Fauteux C.J.C. said:
Obviously, the manner in which the Attorney General of the day exercises his
statutory discretion may be questioned or censured by the legislative body to which
he is answerable, but that again is foreign to the determination of the question
now under consideration. Enforcement of the law and especially of the criminal
law would be impossible unless someone in authority be vested with some measure
of discretionary power. 43

The courts have hitherto operated on the assumption that the vast discretionary powers exercised by Crown counsel as agents of the Attorney
General will be exercised in the best interests of justice because of the prosecutor's role as a "minister of justice" who is above partisan advocacy. 4'
Indeed, the reluctance of the Canadian judiciary to interfere with the exercise

of prosecutorial discretion is underscored by the recent decision by a close
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada to bury, or at least curtail the
growth of, the infant doctrine of abuse of process. 45
Closely related to the judicial reluctance to invade the domain of
prosecutorial discretion is the relatively passive role assigned by Canadian

The Canadian System of Criminal Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at ch. 3, passlin.
Cohen concludes (at 195) that ". . . optimism over our future ability to control the
prosecutor appears to be an unwarranted luxury. The discretions of the prosecutor,
vast in scope as they are, seemingly are immune to effective challenge." However, see
Graburn, The Relationship of the Crown Attorney to the Attorney General (1976), 35
C.R.N.S. 259.
43 [1971] S.C.R. 680 at 686, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 480 at 484.
44

See, generally, Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16 at 23, 110 C.C.C. 263 at

269 per Rand J.; Shapray, The Prosecutor as a Minister of Justice (1969), 15 McGill
L.J. 125; Turner, The Role of Crown Counsel in Canadian Prosecutions (1962), 40 Can.
B. Rev. 439; and Bowen-Coulthurst, Some Observations on the Duties of a Prosecutor
(1969), 11 Crim. L.Q. 377.
45 Rourke v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1021, 76 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 35 C.C.C. (2d)
129. In giving the reasons of the Court, Pigeon J. said: "For the reasons I gave in The
Queen v. Osborn, I cannot admit of any general discretionary power in courts of criminal
jurisdiction to stay proceedings regularly instituted because the prosecution is considered
oppressive." (at 1043 (S.C.R.), 209 (D.L.R.), 145 (C.C.C.)) However, it does appear
that abuse of process is a doctrine that might still be summoned to aid in exceptional
circumstances. See Re Orysiuk and The Queen, [1977] 6 W.W.R. 410, 37 C.C.C. (2d)
445 (Alta. C.A.). A vast area of case law has been carved out in recent years by the
doctrine of abuse of process. The intense judicial activity in this area has been paralleled
by a burgeoning field of law journal commentary. See, generally, Angene, Case References OILAbuse of Process (1977), 37 C.R.N.S. 153; Barton, Abuse of Process as a
Plea in Bar of Trial (1972), 15 Crim. L.Q. 437; Chasse, Abuse of Process as a Control
of ProsecutorialDiscretion (1970), 10 C.R.N.S. 392; Chasse, The Crown's Power to
Withdraw Charges (1976), 33 C.R.N.S. 218; Chasse, The Re-laid Charge and Autrefois
Acquit (1971), 13 C.R.N.S. 196; Ewaschuk, The Rule Against Multiple Convictions and
Abuse of Process (1974), 28 C.R.N.S. 28; Mewett, Nemo bis Vexari (1974), 16 Crim.
L.Q. 382; Sheppard, Rule against Multiple Convictions (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 627;
Stenning, Observations on the Supreme Court of Canada's Decision in R. v. Osborn
(1970), 13 Crim. L.Q. 164; and Sun, The Discretionary Power to Stay Criminal Proceedings (1974), 1 Dal. L.J. 482. Also see Cohen, Abuse of Process: The Aftermath
of Rourke (1977), 39 C.R.N.S. 349; and the recent comments by Olah, The Doctrine of
Abuse of Process: Alive and Well in Canada (1978), 1 C.R. (3d) 341.
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jurisprudence to the trial judge faced. with the entry of a guilty plea by the
defendant. Unlike his counterpart in the American federal courts, the Canadian trial judge is not bound by law to investigate the circumstances surrounding all guilty pleas before accepting them.4 6 His failure to inquire into
such circumstances may result in the reversal of a conviction where the appellate court feels that there is some doubt as to whether the defendant
"fully" understood the nature of the charge. 47 Where the defendant has been
represented by defence counsel, however, such a reversal of conviction will
occur infrequently. 48 In other words, the presence of defence counsel generally will excuse the trial judge from conducting a meticulous inquiry into
the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea. 49 In sum, the lack of a requirement under Canadian law that a judge ferret out the critical factors that may
have led to the defendant's decision to plead guilty has effectively created
an environment in which it is possible for Crown and defence counsel to
enter into plea bargains behind the inscrutable veil of secrecy.
A further explanation for judicial silence as to the question of prosecutorial plea bargaining may lie in the fact that the law journal commentators, professional bodies, and law reform commissions only recently have
begun to tackle the issue in a frank and critical manner. The event that
precipitated open debate about plea bargaining in Canada appears to have
been the publication of Brian Grosman's work on the prosecutor.50 Conclusions as to the propriety of plea bargaining have been mixed; some
commentators have advocated total abolition while others have contended
that it should be permitted to continue, subject to strict controls.51 The
degree of interest in plea bargaining may be gauged by the fact that the
Law Society of Upper Canada sponsored two panel discussions that in46
Adgey v. The Queen (1973), 39 D.L.R. (3d) 553, 13 C.C.C. (2d) 177 (S.C.C.).
Also see the annotations by A.E. Popple in (1946), 1 C.R. 183 and 260.
47
Brosseau v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 181 at 190, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 139 at 147,
[1969] 3 C.C.C. 129 at 138. R. v. Johnson (1945), 62 B.C.R. 199, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 75,
85 C.C.C. 56 (C.A.). Also see R. v. Haines (1960), 127 C.C.C. 125 (B.C.C.A.).
48R. v. Millina (1946), 62 B.C.R. 532, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 124, 86 C.C.C. 374 (C.A.);
Brosseau v. The Queen, id.; R. v. Leonard (1975), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 252 (Ont. C.A.).
49 Of course, there may be situations where the courts may set aside a guilty plea
even though the defendant was represented by counsel; for example, where defence
counsel has become embroiled in a conflict of interest (R. v. Stork (1975), 24 C.C.C.
(2d) 210 (B.C.C.A.)), or where the defendant is not represented by counsel of his
choice (R. v. Butler (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 381 (Ont. C.A.)). Furthermore, it must
be remembered that a trial judge should investigate where the accused person wishes
to withdraw his guilty plea: R. v. Gagne (1956), 20 W.W.R. 401 at 408 per Johnson
J.A. (Alta. C.A.).
50 Grosman, Conflict and Compromise in the Criminal Courts: New Directions in
Legal Research (1969), 11 Crim. L.Q. 292; Grosman, The Prosecutor: An Inquiry into
the Exercise of Discretion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
51 Two of those who oppose plea bargaining are Bowen-Coulthurst, supra note 44,
at 377; and Ratushny, Plea Bargaining and the Public (1972), 20 Chitty's L.J. 238.
Among those who favour regulated plea bargaining are Cohen, supra note 42, at 187-88;
Note, Decisions on Sentencing (1972), 14 Crim. L.Q. 396 at 398; Editorial (1976), 25
Chitty's L.J. 78; Grosman, The Prosecutor:An Inquiry into the Exercise of Discretion,
supra note 50, at 100-04; and Hyman, Legal Bargaining (1970), 18 Chitty's L.J. 266.
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cluded rigorous coverage of the ethical issues raised by plea bargaining in
the Canadian courts. 52
Within the last five years, three major bodies-the Law Reform Commissions of Canada and Ontario, and the Canadian Bar Association-have
expressed strong views as to the propriety of plea bargaining. A major
problem raised by analysis of these views is the inherent ambiguity that
envelopes the very concept of "plea bargaining." While the Law Reform
Commission of Canada calls for the abolition of "plea bargaining," 53 the
Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct clearly legitimizes
the practice of arriving at "tentative agreements. '54 To add to the semantic
confusion, the Ontario Law Reform Commission calls for the abolition of
plea bargaining, but nevertheless presents a series of ten guidelines for "plea
negotiation" or "plea discussions." 55 Only the Law Reform Commission of
Canada furnishes a definition of plea bargaining-"any agreement by the
accused to plead guilty in return for the promise of some benefit." 50 However, none of these bodies attempts to draw any clear boundaries between
plea bargains and plea negotiations, discussions, or agreements. The one
thread that appears to unite them is a revulsion against the notion that a
prosecutor may grant some concession to the defendant on the sole ground

52 See Panel Discussion on "Problems in Ethics and Advocacy-Plea Discussions,"
[1969] Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures (Toronto: DeBoo, 1969) at
299-311; and Panel Discussion on "Plea and Sentence Negotiations," in Proceedings of
the Programme on Criminal Law: Representation After Conviction (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, Department of Continuing Education, October 1970).
53 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Fourth Annual Report, supra note 2, at 14.
54 Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 7:
Where, following investigation,
(a) a defence lawyer bona fide concludes and advises his accused client that an
acquittal of the offence charged is uncertain or unlikely,
(b) the client is prepared to admit the necessary factual and mental elements,
(c) the lawyer fully advises the client of the implications and possible consequences, and particularly of the detachment of the court, and
(d) the client so instructs him, it is proper for the lawyer to discuss with the
prosecutor and for them tentatively to agree on the entry of a plea of "guilty"
to the offence charged or to a lesser or included offence appropriate to the
admissions, and also on a disposition or sentence to be proposed to the court.
The public interest must not be or appear to be sacrificed in the pursuit of
an apparently expedient means of disposing of doubtful cases, and all pertinent circumstances surrounding any tentative agreements, if proceeded with,
must be fully and fairly disclosed in open court. The judge must not be involved in any such discussions or tentative agreements, save to be informed
thereof. (Emphasis added.)
55Law Reform Commission of Ontario, Report on Administration of Ontario
Courts, Part 11, supra note 9, at 125.
56 This is based on the definition found in Ferguson and Roberts, supra note 10,
at 501:
[Tihe practice whereby the accused uses his right to plead not guilty and demand
a full trial to bargain for a benefit that is usually related to the charge or the
sentence. In other words, plea bargaining means the accused's plea of guilty has
been bargained for and some consideration has been received for it.

19791

Plea Bargaining

58
that it is "expedient" to do so;57 unlike the position in the United States,
they feel that reducing the case backlog is never a sufficient motive for showing leniency towards the defendant. In other words, the public's faith in an
impartial system of justice must be preserved at all costs:

Justice should not be, and should not be seen to be, something that
chased at the bargaining table. Neither the public nor the offender
such a system. Once the Crown has decided in the public interest to
not be used as a substitute
charge, bargaining for a plea should
adjudication on guilt or sentence.5 9

can be purcan respect
prosecute a
for judicial

The unfortunate analyst who attempts to identify with any degree of

clarity the positions espoused by these three bodies is left with the feeling
that he knows what they are against, but very little as to precisely what kinds
of relationships between Crown and defence counsel are regarded as legitimate. Such ambiguity of presentation leaves the lawyers in the field effectively rudderless in a highly controversial area in the criminal justice system.
Since the courts are not prepared to assume control over the exercise of

prosecutorial discretion, the whole matter is left in the hands of the individual
attorneys general. One of the few provinces in which some attempt has been

made to rectify the situation has been Ontario. In 1972, and again in 1976,
the Attorney General promulgated a series of principles applicable to "plea

discussions":
1. The proper administration of justice is the paramount consideration in all plea
discussions, and, as with all the duties of the Crown Attorney due regard must
be had for the rights of the accused, the protection of the public and the
interest of the victim in accepting the plea of guilty to a lesser or included
offence.
2. The Crown Attorney should do nothing to compel a plea of guilty to a lesser
number of charges or a lesser or included offence.
3. The Crown Attorney should indict only on those charges on which he intends
to proceed to trial or, in trials in the Provincial Judges' Court, the Crown
Attorney should, with leave of the court, withdraw those charges on which he
does not intend to proceed to trial.
4. The Crown Attorney should not consent to the acceptance of a plea of guilty
to an offence which has not been committed.
5. The Crown Attorney should not consent to the acceptance of a plea of guilty
to a charge that cannot be prosecuted because it is barred at law.
6. In all discussions with defence counsel the Crown Attorney must maintain
his freedom to do his duty as he sees fit. Nothing should be said or done to
fetter the freedom of the Crown Attorney and the defence counsel.
57 See Law Reform Commission of Ontario, Report on Administration of Ontario
Courts, Part II, supra note 9, at 124:
To accede to the negotiation of pleas of guilty as a method of economizing on
means to provide for the proper disposition of caseloads in the criminal courts
is to resort to procedures that will corrupt the administration of justice and
destroy it as an effective power in the regulation of society. It will destroy public
confidence in the courts and create distrust and suspicion of favours. The real
ligaments that hold society together are to be found in the fair, just and open
procedures of the courts.
Also see the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Procedure: Control of the
Process, supra note 8. The Canadian Bar Association, supra note 7, clearly states that
the public interest should not be sacrificed in the service of expedience.
58 See, for example, A.B.A., Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, supra note 20,
Standard 1.8. Also see the views of Burger C.J. in Santobello, quoted supra note 21.
59 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Procedure: Control of the Process, supra note 8, at 46.
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7. The Crown Attorney may state to defence counsel the views he may give if
asked by the presiding judge to comment on the matter of sentence. The
Crown Attorney should not agree to a specific sentence. He may draw the
attention of the presiding judge to any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may appear to him to be relevant and may make submissions concerning
the appropriate form and range of sentence. However he should take the clear
position that the matter of sentence is strictly for the judge and that any
statement that is made cannot bind the Attorney General in the exercise of
his discretion whether to appeal against a sentence or not. This discretion of
mine however will only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.
8. The Crown Attorney always should consider himself as agent of the Attorney
General and, as such, responsible for the proper administration of justice.
9. Apart from exceptional circumstances neither the Crown Attorney nor the
defence counsel, either alone or together, should discuss with the judge matters
bearing on the exercise of the judge's discretion, in the judge's chambers or
any place other than in open court. Where attendance in the judge's chambers
is dictated by the circumstances, the Crown Attorney should always request
that a court reporter be present to take down the full discussion which should
form part of the record of the case. All representations to the judge on which
he is to base the exercise of his discretion concerning a plea of guilty should
be made in open court. 00

However, since no procedures are established for enforcing these principles,
it is a matter of some debate whether they have any concrete effect in everyday practice. Furthermore, it is clear that the Ontario guidelines make absolutely no attempt to identify the types of cases in which the Crown attorney
may properly exercise his discretion to reduce a charge or make some other
Ccconcession" to the defendant as a consequence of "plea discussions." The
interests of "justice," the public, the victim, and the defendant are left to
the exclusive discretion of the Crown attorney; unlike its counterpart in the
United States, the court does not have the final word with respect to these
matters.
Perhaps in response to the emergence of plea bargaining from the dark
realms of the unmentionable into the light of informed public debate, there
have been some indications in the 1970's that the Canadian judiciary are
reconsidering their previous reluctance to comment on the propriety of prosecutorial plea bargaining. In this decade, courts in both Quebec and Alberta
have dealt with the issue in a definitive fashion. In Quebec, there have been
two cases in which the practice has been condemned unequivocally. In
60 Memorandum to all Crown Attorneys from the Attorney General of Ontario,
June 30, 1972. In 1976 the Attorney General released a memorandum clarifying two
aspects of the 1972 guidelines:
1. Expediency in reducing workload is not acceptable as a reason for accepting
a plea to a lesser offence or to a lesser number of offences. Expediency in this
sense does not include weaknesses in the Crown's case on the major charge or
charges, which may be a valid reason for accepting a plea to a lesser offence
or to a lesser number of offences.
2. You should be careful to comply with the final sentence of principle Number
9 which reads "All representations to the judge on which he is to base the
exercise of his discretion concerning a plea of guilty should be made in open
court." This simply means that whenever you accept a plea to a lesser offence
or to a lesser number of offences you should state in open court your reasons
for doing so. The statement need not be lengthy but should be sufficient to
satisfy the public in each case that there is nothing sinister or clandestine in
the process of plea discussion.
(Memorandum from Deputy Director of Crime Attorneys, February 26, 1976.)
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Perkins v. The Queen, the Court of Appeal held that it could not accept the
practice, whether the initiative for plea bargaining came from the Crown or
the defence."' Similarly, in A.G. Can. v. Roy, Hugessen J. held that: "Pleabargaining is not to be regarded with favour."' ' It is significant that in Perkins, Rinfret J.A. contends, at least where offences carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence are concerned, that the Crown should not charge a lesser
offence solely to avoid the imposition of the penalty prescribed by the statute:
Ou bien l'accus6 est coupable et alors ildoit subir les peines mandatoires qu'impose
la Loi existante, ou iln'est pas coupable et doit 6tre acquitt6.
11est possible que, dans certains cas oit la Couronne entretient des doutes sur sa
de
capacit6 de prouver l'accusation telle que port6e, elle accepte un plaidoyer
culpabilit6 sur une offense moindre qu'elle salt etre en mesure d'tablir. 63

It is not clear whether the Court wished to establish a general principle
restricting the power of the Crown to reduce charges in cases where it has
the means to prove the greater offence at trial. Of course, the uniform application of such a principle would constitute a singularly effective device for
decreasing the incidence of plea bargaining. 4 The English courts have long
exercised a similar power as a means of controlling prosecutorial discretion;
in effect, they have insisted that the actual charges laid in a criminal case
should reflect accurately the particular factual background to any individual
case.6 ' It remains to be seen whether the Canadian courts, as a result of the
61 [1976] Qu6. C.A. 527 at 528, 35 C.R.N.S. 222 at 226 per Rinfret J.A.
02 (1972), 18 C.R.N.S. 89 at 92 (Qu6. Q.B.).
6-Supra note 61, at 529 (Qu6. C.A.), 226 (C.R.N.S.):

Either the accused is guilty and must face the mandatory sentence imposed by
law, or he is innocent and must be acquitted ... of course, if the Crown doubts
its ability to prove a charge, a plea to a lesser offence may be accepted. (Author's
translation.)
64 The means for implementing the new approach, should the courts wish to do so,
may be found in section 534(4) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, which
provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, where an accused pleads not
guilty of the offence charged but guilty of an included or other offence, the court
may in its discretion with the consent of the prosecutor accept such plea of guilty
and if such plea is accepted, shall find the accused not guilty of the offence
charged. (Emphasis added.)
To date, there is no evidence to suggest that this section is being used regularly as a
means of controlling prosecutorial plea bargaining. For discussion of section 534(4), see
Panel Discussion on "Plea and Sentence Negotiations," supra note 52, at 18-19; and
Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 9, at 121-22. The Commission indicates
its belief that the control of plea negotiations should be a matter for the Attorney General, rather than the courts. For the applicable procedures when a plea to an included
offence is not accepted by the prosecutor or the Court, see R. v. Pentiluk (1974), 21

C.C.C. (2d) 87 (Ont. C.A.).
65 See, for example, R. v. Soanes, [1948] 1 All E.R. 289, 32 Cr. App. R. 136; R. v.
Bedwellty Justices, [1970] Crim. L. Rev. 601. In R. v. Coe, [1969] 1 All E.R. 65 at 67,
53 Cr. App. R. 66 at 68, Lord Parker C.J. stated that the prosecution should not
invite magistrates to proceed summarily on mixed offences, where the facts were serious
enough to warrant trial on indictment:
Above all that, there is the proper administration of criminal justice to be considered, questions such as the protection of society and the stamping out of this
sort of criminal enterprise, if it is possible. This court would like to say with all
the emphasis at its command that the prosecution in a serious case such as this
is not acting in the best interest of society by inviting summary trial.
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concerns expressed in the Perkins case, will assume a more active role in
restricting the freedom of Crown counsel to make meaningful concessions
to the defendant. In R. v. Wood, 66 the Supreme Court of Alberta appears
to have adopted a similar position with respect to the propriety of plea bargaining. In this case, McDermid J.A. quotes, with evident approval, the view
of the Law Reform Commission of Canada that plea bargaining is incompatible with a "decent system of criminal justice." 67 In none of these cases
did the court attempt to define what it meant by plea bargaining, nor
did it attempt to specify what it regarded as a "proper" pre-trial relationship
between prosecutor and defence counsel.
To date, these three cases represent the only explicit judicial pronouncements as to the propriety of prosecutorial plea bargaining in Canada. It is
indeed curious that the Ontario courts have ignored the issue, since plea
bargaining has been a keenly debated topic among legal practitioners in that
province,6 8 and since Brian Grosman's work appeared to indicate that the
practice existed to a significant extent in metropolitan Toronto. 9 Nevertheless, even when it has had the opportunity to do so, 70 the Ontario Court of
Appeal has refused steadfastly to take a firm position as to the propriety of
plea bargaining.
A recent development of some significance is the emergence of a small
body of case law that perhaps reflects some indirect judicial approval of
plea bargaining. This line of decisions apparently stems from an Ontario
decision in which Judge Graburn of the County Court actively encouraged
counsel to submit "sentence agreements" to the Bench. 71 Insofar as such
agreements will often be reached after plea bargaining, one may safely assume
that the learned Judge was bestowing at least tacit approval upon the practice.
In R. v. Greene, he said:
I welcome the assistance where counsel are able to arrive at a consensus as to the
appropriate sentence in the case. I have indicated in the past that this Court will
contrary
endeavour to give effect to those representations, unless they should be
72
to principle, or unless they should appear unreasonable on their face.
66 [1976] 2 W.W.R. 135, 26 C.C.C. (2d) 100 (Alta. C.A.).
67 Id. at 144-45 (W.W.R.), 108-09 (C.C.C.). Although McDermid J.A. dissented
from the actual decision in Wood, the principles he expounded were approved by the
majority of the Court. (See 147 (W.W.R.), 110 (C.C.C.) per Moir J.A.).
68 See the Panel Discussions, supranote 52.
69 Grosman, The Prosecutor: An Inquiry into the Exercise of Discretion, supra
note 50.
70
See, for example, R. v. Agozzino, [1970] 1 O.R. 480, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 380 (C.A.).
Extra-judicially, some comment has been forthcoming. For example, in the Panel Discussion on "Problems in Ethics and Advocacy," supra note 52, at 302, it is clear that
Chief Justice Gale was not convinced of the necessity for plea bargaining.
71 R. v. Greene (1971), 20 C.R.N.S. 238 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
72 Id. Judge Graburn has dealt with his approach more extensively in the Panel
Discussion on "Plea and Sentence Negotiations," supra note 52. In fact, he goes so far
as to say (at 16) that:
When two experienced members of the Bar, after careful thought, present a proposal in open Court, it should only be rejected for the most compelling reasons,
such as the proposal being wrong in principle; otherwise I think the Court should
give effect to it.
It is Judge Graburn's view, in Greene, supra note 71, at 239, however, that Crown
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The Ontario Court of Appeal apparently has endorsed the view that

counsel may advance a joint sentence submission even where a specific term
of imprisonment is concerned. 73 The trend towards acceptance of such joint

submissions was strengthened further by a recent decision in the Manitoba
Court of Appeal, R. v. Simoneau.74 Although it was emphasized that this
case did not involve even the slightest whisper of a plea bargain, the majority
of the Court advanced some clear-cut views in relation to the practice of

joint sentence submissions:
The extent of Crown counsel's submissions on sentence in Canada may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, or indeed between one Crown counsel and another
as suggested by Hogarth in Sentencingas a Human Process (1971), atp. 191. But the
authority of the Crown to offer suggestions concerning sentence is clear....
It has been suggested that it is objectionable for counsel to mention a specific
term or, as a variation of making a specific recommendation, to suggest a range
of sentence. Most often neither Crown counsel nor counsel for the accused will
name a specific term nor suggest a range but will confine their suggestion to the
type of sentence. However, I see nothing wrong in being specific where the circumstances call for it. Once it is accepted that Crown counsel can make a submission on sentence (whether in favour of severity or leniency) it should be
possible to permit particularity. Submission on sentence must of course be based
on material in the record. Such submissions do not contravene the well-established
doctrine that the Court is not interested in personal opinions of counsel .... In
my view, there is no purpose in creating an artificial restraint on what counsel
may say to the Court by declaring as a matter of law that counsel should not
be permitted to make specific recommendations....
All of this is subject to the underlying premise that any recommendation, whether
general or specific, will not fetter the discretion of the Court. Anything counsel
may say will be no more than of help to the Judge making the decision. It must
be clear to everyone that the comments of counsel are only submissions, which
the Court may accept or reject. It is the Judge's responsibility and his alone to
decide on the fitness of a sentence.
On the question of a joint submission about sentence, counsel for the Association supported the practice and said that it has never been suggested that counsel
for the Crown and defence could bind a trial Judge by agreeing to a particular
disposition....
In my view, it is not objectionable for a properly arrived at joint submission
to be made nor, where the circumstances call for it, is it objectionable to recommend a specific term, subject always to75 the overriding discretion of the Court
to accept or reject any recommendation.

On the other hand, it may be noted that in the Wood case, McDermid
J.A. clearly rejected such an approach, at least as far as the Alberta courts
are concerned, when he stated his belief that Crown counsel generally should
play a restricted role in the sentencing process:
Crown Counsel is entitled to make a submission to the Judge as to sentence.
counsel is entitled to suggest only the form of the sentence-the quantum of sentence is
a matter falling within the "absolute jurisdiction of the Court." Judge Graburn's approval
of the plea bargaining process is clearly based upon his experience as a Crown attorney
in Toronto. See the Panel Discussion on "Plea and Sentence Negotiations," supra note
52, at 7.
73
R. v. Lapointe (1978), 2 W.C.B. 119 (Ont. C.A.).
74 [1978] 3 W.W.R. 461, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 307 (Man. C.A.).
75 Id. at 463-65 (W.W.R.), 314-16 (C.C.C.).
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However, in my opinion, the preferable practice is not to do so unless he is
requested by the Judge for a submission. 70
Broken Plea Bargains
While most Canadian courts have avoided committing themselves to

a firm stand on the propriety of plea bargaining, they certainly have not been
able to side-step the unfortunate consequences of those plea bargains that
have turned sour.77 Unfortunately, their approach to the grave problems
posed by broken plea bargains by no means has demonstrated the virtue

of consistency.
All of the courts that have considered the issue have been able to agree

on one basic principle at least. This principle is that, whatever the nature of
an agreement as to sentence may be, it cannot bind the trial judge in any
manner whatsoever. Indeed, Canadian judges have rejected emphatically any
move that appears to impinge upon their absolute discretion as to sentencing.

As the Quebec Court of Appeal put it, "Counsel for the Crown is clearly
entitled to suggest a sentence, but it is the prerogative of the Court to accept or
to reject such suggestion. '78 In the few cases where the Crown has not
carried out its part of the agreement at trial, the view of the courts appears
to be that the defendant should be entitled (depending on the circumstances)
either to specific performance of the agreement, 79 or to withdraw his plea of
70

Supra note 66, at 145 (W.W.R.), 109 (C.C.C.).

77 See, generally, Cohen, supra note 42, at 185-88; and Ruby, Sentencing (Toronto:

Butterworths, 1976) at 71-77.
78
R. v. Mouffe (1972), 16 C.R.N.S. 257 at 261 per Rinfret J.A. (Qu6. C.A.). Also
see R. v. Johnston, [1970] 2 O.R. 780, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 64 (C.A.); R. v. Fleury (1971),
23 C.R.N.S. 164 (Qu6. C.A.); R. v. Kirkpatrick, [1971] Qu6. C.A. 337; R. v. Wood,
supra note 66; R. v. Simoneau, supra note 74; R. v. Cusack (1978), 41 C.C.C. (2d) 289
(N.S.S.C., App. Div.); R. v. Thomas, [1968] 1 O.R. 1, [1968] 2 C.C.C. 84 (C.A.); and
R. v. Pretty (1971), 2 N. & P.E.I. R. 10, 5 C.C.C. (2d) 332 (P.E.I.S.C., C.C.A.).
Nevertheless, as Ruby points out, supra note 77, at 75, there are many factors that may
operate to persuade the trial judge to follow the sentencing recommendations of the
Crown. In Fleury, at 178-79, Turgeon J.A. agreed with the comments of the trial judge:
The trial judge is inclined, particularly when faced with a plea of guilty, to adopt
the suggestion put forward by counsel for the Crown, since the latter has received
the confidential report of the investigating officer and is as a result familiar with
certain information and with certain extenuating circumstances of which the
judge may be totally ignorant.
See the similar views expressed by Schultz J.A. in R. v. Clarke (1959), 124 C.C.C. 284
at 287-88 (Man. C.A.).
79 See, for example, R. v. Brown (1972), 8 C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont. C.A.). In this
case the defendant agreed to plead guilty if Crown counsel would inform the Court
that he was not asking that the sentence be consecutive to the sentence the defendant
was then serving. The defendant pleaded guilty, but the Crown broke its part of the
bargain and, in effect, asked the Court to impose a consecutive sentence. The defendant
appealed the sentence that had been imposed and the Ontario Court of Appeal changed
the sentence to a concurrent term. Also see R. v. Smith, [1975] 3 W.W.R. 454, 8 C.C.C.
(2d) 291 (B.C.S.C.). In this case, the Crown had undertaken not to proceed with certain charges if the defendant were to hand over a quantity of marijuana to the police.
Although the defendant kept his side of the bargain, the Crown nevertheless laid charges
in violation of its undertaking. Berger J. issued a writ of prohibition with respect to those
charges on the basis that the Crown's conduct constituted an abuse of the process of
the Court. For a discussion of the question of whether undertakings made by federal
prosecutors may bind their provincial counterparts, see R. v. BRetesh (1976), 35 C.R.N.S.
238 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
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guilty and undergo a new trial.80 In A.G. Can. v. Roy, Hugessen J. suggested
that the following procedure be adopted so as to avoid any misunderstandings
on the part of the defendant:
Where there has been a plea of guilty and Crown Counsel recommends a sentence,
a Court, before accepting the plea, should satisfy itself that the accused fully
understands that his fate is, within the limits set by law, in the discretion of the
judge, and that the latter is not bound by the suggestions or opinions of Crown
Counsel. If the accused does not understand this, the guilty plea ought not to
be accepted. 8 1

Unhappily, the uniformity of judicial approach manifested in these circumstances is dissipated completely when the broken plea bargain involves the
appeal of the attorney general against an "agreed sentence," rather than the
failure of Crown counsel to fulfil his commitment as to sentence before the
trial judge.
One of the most common situations in which a plea bargain has been
repudiated unilaterally occurs where the Crown decides to appeal against
a sentence that has been imposed by the trial judge with the full consent of
both counsel. At trial, Crown counsel will have agreed to maintain a certain
position with respect to sentence; in exchange for a plea of guilty, he will
have undertaken either to make an active submission in favour of an "agreed
sentence" or, alternatively, to indicate at least his acquiescence in the contentions advanced by defence counsel. There have been a number of cases
in which the attorney general has launched an appeal against the "agreed
sentence" on the grounds that the "bargain" fails to take adequate account
of the interests of society as a whole. What has been the position of the
Courts in these difficult circumstances?
At one extreme, there are two recent cases from Qu6bec s2 in which the
Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and increased the sentences
imposed on the defendants. Significantly, in neither case was any opportunity
afforded to the defendant to withdraw his plea and take a new trial. In
light of the fact that the defendants in these cases pleaded guilty predominantly as a consequence of their expectations as to the nature of the sentence
to be imposed, the approach of the Court has grave and disturbing implications for the system of criminal justice. No doubt the Court's views as to
the propriety of plea bargaining8 3 shaped the course of its decisions, but it
is indeed questionable whether these particular defendants should have been
sacrificed as an object lesson in the Court's crusade against plea bargaining.

80 See R. v. Ah Tom, supra note 39; R. v. Stone, supra note 39.
81 Supra note 62, at 92.
82 R. v. Mouffe, supra note 78; R. v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 78. In Kirkpatrick,
the Court said, at 338 (translation):
It would be desirable if counsel for the Attorney-General were to refrain from
making statements which their superiors subsequently find themselves forced to
retract. Nevertheless, we are not bound by such statements, and must, as a result
assume the responsibilities which are properly ours.
83 These views became very clear in the later case of Perkins v. The Queen, supra
note 61.
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At the other extreme are two cases from Saskatchewan 4 and Ontario8"
in which the respective Courts of Appeal indicated that they felt bound to
enforce the original undertaking made by Crown counsel at trial even though
they had serious doubts as to its propriety. In the Ontario case of R. v.
Agozzino, the Court of Appeal said:
There is evidence before us to indicate that had it not been for the position taken
by the Crown which was subsequently adopted by the Magistrate, the accused
would not have pleaded guilty. The circumstances, therefore, dictate a dismissal
of the Crown's appeal as to sentence even though, had we thought ourselves at
liberty to consider its propriety, we probably would have come to a different
conclusion....
In effect the appeal repudiates the position taken by Crown counsel at the trial
and we do not care to give effect to that repudiation.80

Of course, this approach is not necessarily preferable to that adopted by the
Qu6bec Court of Appeal in the two cases mentioned above. After all, while
the Court may be treating the defendant with the utmost fairness, it may
nevertheless be possible that the interest of society in general, and of the
victim in particular, may be overlooked completely. Neither approach, therefore, can be accepted with any degree of equanimity.
Lying somewhere between these extremes are two cases from Qu6bec, 81
and one case from Prince Edward Island, s8 in which the Court takes the
view that, while the Court of Appeal cannot be bound by the position that
Crown counsel may have taken at trial, it nevertheless will only interfere
with the sentence imposed in "exceptional circumstances." Perhaps this halfway house approach is represented best by the judgment of Hugessen J. in
A.G. Can. v. Roy:
84 R. v. Christie (1956), 18 W.W.R. 442, 115 C.C.C. 55 (Sask. C.A.). In spite
of a vigorous dissent by McNiven J.A., the majority opinion of Gordon J.A., at 443
(W.W.R.), 56 (C.C.C.), dispenses with the issue in one paragraph:
So far as the accused Wolfe is concerned, the agent of the Attorney-General consented to suspended sentence as against him. We do not think that under these circumstances an appeal by the Crown should be entertained, although we are of
the opinion that he was treated very lightly.
For consideration of the issue whether a settlement, which includes waiver of a right to
appeal from reassessments of income tax, is valid in the light of a threat of prosecution,
see Smerchanski v. MNR, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 23, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 745.
8
5R. v. Agozzino, supra note 70. Once again the Court deals with the issue without
any attempt to analyse the alternative courses of action open to them.
86
1d. at 481-82 (O.R.), 381-82 (C.C.C.) per Gale C.J.O. In the case of R. v.
LeBlanc, R. v. Long (1938), 13 M.P.R. 343, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 154, 71 C.C.C. 232
(N.B.C.A.), the Court gave some indication that they might adopt the same approach
as that manifested in Christie and Agozzino. In the LeBlanc case, the Court rejected
the defendants' contention that Crown counsel had made an undertaking not to appeal.
However, Baxter CJ. said that if such a promise had been made and subsequently
broken, "it might afford some reason for this Court to say that it would not act under
such circumstances." (at 351 (M.P.R.), 160 (D.L.R.), 239 (C.C.C.))
87
R. v. Fleury, supra note 78; and A.G. Can. v. Roy, supra note 62. It may be
noted that the statements of the Courts relating to the principles to be applied in the
case of a broken bargain appear to be obiter, since the Courts felt that the sentences
imposed were in fact correct in terms of general sentencing principles.
88
R. v. MacArthur (1978), 15 N. & P.E.I. R. 72, 39 C.C.C. (2d) 158 (P.E.I.S.C.,
App. Div.).
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The Crown, like any other litigant ought not to be heard to repudiate before
an appellate court the position taken by its counsel in the trial court, except
for the gravest possible reasons. Such reasons might be where the Crown can
demonstrate that its counsel had in some way been misled, or finally, where it
can be shown that the public interest in the orderly administration of justice is
outweighed by the gravity of the crime and the gross insufficiency of the
sentence.89
Undoubtedly, the greater flexibility of this approach renders it infinitely more

attractive than the two other lines of authority discussed. However, it too
has been subjected to criticism. For example, it has been suggested that the
principle laid down by Hugessen J. is far too vague to be of any practical
assistance to a defendant who wishes to enter into a plea bargain with the
Crown. To those commentators who believe that the plea bargaining process

has become "an integral part of the administration of justice," the failure to
establish a specific rule as to when the Crown may override successfully a

sentence agreement made at trial is regarded as an unjustifiable deterrent to
those accused persons who seek to participate in the process. 90 Of course,
such an argument has no persuasive force for those who reject the propriety
of all plea bargaining, and it is perfectly clear that Hugessen J. did not base
his approach on the assumption that prosecutorial plea bargaining is a legitimate practice; indeed, he said later in his judgment:
The Crown may feel that it has made a bad bargain, but the solution to that must
9
surely be for the Crown to make no bargains at all. 1

On the other hand, this approach does not meet entirely the objections of
those who feel that the Attorney General should have complete freedom to
appeal against those sentences that do not adequately protect the interests

of justice or the victim of the crime. A fourth-and perhaps the most satisfactory-approach to the problem has manifested itself in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Alberta in R. v. Wood. In that case, the Court

adopted the following principle:
A position taken by Crown Counsel before a trial Judge is a circumstance to be
taken into consideration, but we cannot be bound by any such position taken
92
and are not willing to restrict the appeal of the Crown by such a consideration.

The merit of this approach, of course, is that it preserves the freedom of the
court to fulfil its legitimate role as a supervisory body over sentencing practices. Furthermore, there are suggestions in the case to the effect that, where

the court feels the sentence imposed is insupportable in the circumstances,
the defendant should be entitled to a new trial. 93 This result is an approach
89

Supra note 62, at 93.

90 See Decisions on Sentencing, supra note 51.
91
A.G.
92

Can. v. Roy, supra note 62, at 93.
R. v. Wood, supra note 66, at 146 (W.W.R.), 110 (C.C.C.) per McDermid J.A.
93 McDermid J.A. felt that Wood should have been given a new trial (id.). However, the majority of the Court believed that the defendant would be prejudiced unfairly
if such a course were taken in the particular circumstances of this case (at 147
(W.W.R.), 111 (C.C.C.)). Wood had, for example, been interviewed by psychiatrists
after pleading guilty-their evidence would have been "competent and compellable" in
a new trial. In addition, Wood had strictly abided by the terms of a probation order
for about one year and the Court felt that it would be unfair to alter the sentence after
such a long delay.
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that is both eminently fair to the defendant and entirely satisfactory from
the point of view of the broader interests of society as a whole. Significantly,
this is precisely the approach recommended by the American Bar Association
in their Standards Relating to Guilty Pleas, and by94 the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
There is one type of broken bargain that deserves a separate comment.
It is perhaps best illustrated by the case of R. v. Kennedy. 95 Kennedy was
charged with criminal negligence causing death, and with impaired driving.
As the result of a plea bargain struck between defence counsel and the
Crown, he entered a plea of guilty to the lesser charge, and the Crown consequently withdrew the charge of criminal negligence. Kennedy was sentenced
to a short period of confinement and to suspension of his driving licence.
Shortly after the sentence had been served, the husband of the accident victim
instigated a private prosecution for causing death by criminal negligencethe charge previously withdrawn by the Crown. The Attorney General of
Ontario intervened in these proceedings and, after a preliminary inquiry,
Kennedy was indicted. Kennedy applied to the Chief Justice of the High
Court to stay proceedings on the ground that to carry on with them would
constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. The application was refused
by the Chief Justice, and the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected an appeal
against that decision on the technical grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to
intervene at that particular stage of the case. 6 Unfortunately, therefore, the
Court of Appeal did not deal with the merits of the case and failed to lay
down any principle for dealing with the defendant's situation, i.e., where a
plea bargain is broken, not by the Crown, but by the intervention of a private
prosecutor. It is submitted that the approach adopted in R. v. Wood constitutes the most equitable method of dealing with the consequences of such
a broken plea bargain. Such an approach has the undoubted merit of establishing a simple principle that may be applied to all cases of broken plea
bargains.
It is significant that in only two of the cases dealing with broken plea
bargains did the court express a firm view as to the propriety of plea bargaining. Coupled with Perkins, these represent the only definitive statements of
the Canadian courts on this issue. However, it must not be assumed that the
approach of the Canadian courts to the propriety of prosecutorial plea bar94 See American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice, StandardsRelating to Pleas of Guilty, supra note 20. Two amendments provided
for the procedure outlined in the text: Standards 2.1(5) and 3.3(b). See the similar
approach of the American Law Institute, A Model Code of Pre-ArraignmentProcedure,
supra note 22, at s. 350.6.
95 [1972] 2 O.R. 754, 6 C.C.C. 564 (C.A.).
96 Id. at 756 (O.R.), 565 (C.C.C.) per Aylesworth J.A. As to the powers of the
private prosecutor, see, generally, Bums, Private Prosecutions in Canada: The Law and
a Proposal for Change (1975), 21 McGill L.J. 269; and Kaufman, The Role of the
Private Prosecutor:A Critical Analysis of the Complainant'sPosition in Criminal Cases
(1960-61), 7 McGill L.J. 102. In R. v. McGrath (1944), 18 M.P.R. 71, [1944] 3 D.L.R.
669, 81 C.C.C. 303 (N.S.S.C.), there is a very slight indication that the Court may have
been willing to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea in such circumstances. However,
the Court found that the defendant knew the position maintained by the private prosecutor before he entered the plea of guilty.
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gaining is unique within the context of those legal systems whose roots are
in the English common law tradition. In England, the courts have only
discussed the issue of plea bargaining in the situation where the judge has
become involved in pre-trial discussions, 9 7 while in Australia there appears
to have been practically no judicial response to the issue whatsoever. 8 In the
immediate future we may expect that the persistent public clamour over plea
bargaining will result in some sort of change in its presently lugubrious status.
Either the courts will assume more responsibility for regulating the pre-trial
relationship between defence and prosecution counsel (along the lines of
the American Federal Courts), or the attorneys general will attempt to
develop some device for the internal regulation of this relationship. 9 In any
event, it is to be hoped that the present state of the law-in which no party
to the criminal trial process really knows what types of negotiation are
deemed to be proper-will not be permitted to continue without firm protest.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INTO PLEA BARGAINING IN CANADA
In spite of their forceful advocacy in the cause of eliminating prosecutorial plea bargaining, the Law Reform Commission of Canada does not
appear to have based its recommendations upon the foundations of empirical
research. It is submitted that we really do not know enough about the nature
and extent of plea bargaining across Canada to be able to pontificate with
equanimity as to its future within our system of justice. Perhaps the Commission should have determined both the precise extent to which Canadian
courts rely on the entry of a guilty plea, and the actual incidence of plea
bargaining across Canada, before making such sweeping statements about
the practice. Indeed, it may be contended that the empirical data available
at present are so meagre that the contemplation of radical changes in the
trial court process is premature at best, and ill-advised at worst.
97 See R. v. Turner, [1970] 2 Q.B. 321, [1970] 2 All E.R. 281, 54 Cr. App. R. 352;

R. v. Brook, [1970] Crim. L. Rev. 600 (C.A.); R. v. Plimmer (1975), 61 Cr. App. R.
264, [1975] Crim. L. Rev. 730 (C.A.); R. v. Cain, [1975] 2 All E.R. 900, [1976] Crim.
L. Rev. 464 (C.A.); and R. v. Deary, [1977] Crim. L. Rev. 47. Significantly, the Court
of Appeal missed the opportunity to discuss the propriety of pre-trial discussions between
the prosecution and defending counsel in the case of R. v. Hall, [1968] 2 Q.B. 788, 52 Cr.
App. R. 528. A recent study suggests that plea bargaining probably exists to a quite considerable extent in the British jurisdiction of Birmingham. Over a 15 month period, the
researchers interviewed 121 defendants who had changed their pleas from "not guilty" to
"guilty" just prior to trial. Of these persons, 86 claimed to have been persuaded to plead
guilty or were offered "deals" by their barristers. Significantly, strenuous efforts apparently were made by representatives of both the Law Society and the Bar Council to prevent
publication of these findings. See Baldwin and McConville, Negotiated Justice: Pressures
to Plead Guilty (London: Martin Robertson, 1977).
98 See Westling, Plea Bargaining: A Forecast for the Future (1976), 7 Sydney L.
Rev. 424. The first case in which the issue of plea bargaining has been raised is the
recent (unreported) Victoria case of Bruce v. The Queen, which went to the High Court
of Australia. See Sallmann, Book Review (1978), 11 A.N.Z. J. of Criminology 121
at 123.
99 In general, the Law Reform Commission of Canada appears to prefer the development of such internal regulation of prosecutorial discretion to the expansion of the
sphere of judicial control. See Working Paper No. 15, supra note 8, at 59-60. Also see the
similar contention expressed in Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion (1972), 19 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1.
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A.

Incidence of Guilty Pleas in Canada
There are no studies in Canada that show the percentage of persons
who plead guilty in any single jurisdiction over an extended period of time.
Instead, there are a handful of studies that focus upon the practices existing
in particular jurisdictions during specific periods. 100 Nevertheless, there have
been Canadian commentators who have exaggerated grossly the extent to
which Canadian trial courts rely upon the entry of guilty pleas as a means
of disposing of criminal cases. For example, Hogarth, in a study paper prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada, contends that 90 percent
of defendants to criminal charges in Canada plead guilty, 1' 1 while Hagan,
in a recent addition to Canadian criminological literature, 10 2 cites the same
figure without referring to any source whatsoever. Examination of the empirical data that have been released in Canada indicate that these commentators
have seriously distorted the nature of the court process.
Friedland reported that in the 1,476 cases he observed before the Magistrates' Courts of the City of Toronto in 1964, 69 percent of the defendants
pleaded guilty. 10 3 The Canadian Committee on Corrections stated in 1969
that while statistics as to the rates of guilty pleas are lacking, "it is believed
by law enforcement officers that at least from 40 to 50 percent of all convictions for indictable offences are the result of pleas of guilty." 104 The Canadian Civil Liberties Trust conducted a study of Magistrates' Courts in the
cities of Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg during the
month of January, 1970, and concluded that the overall rate of guilty pleas
was 68 percent, with a high of 80 in Winnipeg and a low of 59 in Toronto. 10 r
Hogarth studied a sample of Magistrates from 37 jurisdictions in Ontario
during 1966.106 On the basis of a sample of some 2,396 cases, Hogarth concluded that nearly four out of five of those persons who were convicted had
entered a plea of guilty; however, the author does not indicate the percentage
of persons charged who pleaded guilty.
Recent sophisticated computer analyses of criminal cases in three different Canadian jurisdictions also suggest that the notion that 90 percent of
defendants plead guilty is a dangerous myth. Hann's study of the Magistrates'
10o Grosman, The Prosecutor: An Inquiry into the Exercise of Discretion, supra
note 50; Hartnagel, Plea Negotiations in Canada, supra note 12; Wynne and Hartnagel,
Race and Plea Negotiations: An Analysis of Some CanadianData, supra note 12; Hagan,
Parameters of Criminal Prosecution: An Application of Path Analysis to a Problem of
CriminalJustice, supra note 12; and Klein, Let's Make a Deal: Negotiating Justice, supra
note 12.
101 Studies on Sentencing (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at 57.
102 The DisreputablePleasures, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977) at 159.
103'Detention Before Trial: A Study of Criminal Cases Tried in the Toronto Magistrates' Courts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) at 89.
104 Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ouimet Report) (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1969) at 134.
105 Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust, Due Process Safeguards and Canadian
Criminal Justice (Toronto: Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust, 1971) at 82-83.
For an excellent critique of the methodological limitations of this study, see Wilkins
and Jeffries, Due Process Safeguards and Canadian Criminal Justice: A Critique (197172), 14 Crim. L.Q. 220.
106 Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto: Carswell, 1971) at 270.
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Courts in Toronto during the years 1970 and 1971 unearthed a significantly
lower rate of guilty pleas; on the basis of a sample of 1,655 cases, he concluded that 43.5 percent of accused persons pleaded guilty.10 7 Similarly,
Mackaay furnishes some interesting data as to the rates of guilty pleas in
the Montreal court system. In a study of some 555 cases dealt with by the
"Court House" and 200 cases processed by the "Municipal Court," Mackaay
discovered that 63.5 percent of defendants pleaded guilty at the Court
House while 31.4 percent was the corresponding figure at the Municipal
Court.' 0 8 Finally, a very recent study of the B.C. Provincial Courts provides
a detailed profile of the fate of accused persons in the court process. 10 9 In an
analysis of 50,000 cases which passed through the Provincial Courts during
the first six months of 1976, it was revealed that 49 percent of defendants
entered guilty pleas while, in 22 percent of cases, the Crown withdrew or
stayed the charges. Of those cases that actually proceeded to trial, 20 percent
resulted in conviction, 7 percent in acquittal, and 2 percent in committal to
a higher court.
On the basis of these studies, it is well nigh impossible to establish an
accurate overall estimate of the extent to which criminal cases are disposed
of by means of the guilty plea. About the only statement that may be proferred with any degree of certainty is that there are significant variations in
the rate of guilty pleas as between different jurisdictions in Canada. In any
event, however, the 90 percent rate quoted by Hogarth and Hagan is by no
means representative of the findings published in the available Canadian
research.
The Nature and Extent of Plea Bargaining in Canada
In 1974, Ferguson and Roberts wrote that "since there is [sic] so little
empirical data on the extent and nature of plea bargaining in Canada, it will
be necessary to assume for the sake of argument that many plea bargaining
practices either exist or could exist in one or more regions."" 0 Subsequently,
the Law Reform Commission of Canada based its important policy recommendations upon the Ferguson and Roberts report. It is indeed curious that
the Commission was prepared to instigate potentially far-reaching reforms
in the criminal justice system on the basis of intuition and hearsay.
In Canada, there have been very few rigorous attempts to study plea
bargaining. The pioneering study in this area was undertaken by Brian
Grosman."' Drawing upon both his own experience as a prosecutor and upon
a series of interviews with Crown attorneys in the County of York, Ontario,
Grosman suggested that plea bargaining was an important element in a wellB.

107 Decision Making-The Canadian Criminal Court System: A Systems Analysis,
Vol. 11 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) at 313.
108 Les chemins de la justice-tude du fonctionnement des cours criminelles i
Montrial (Montreal: Groupe de recherche en jurim6trie, Facult6 de droit, U. de M.,

1976) at 32.

109 Ministry of the Attorney General for B.C., Monthly Court List for January to
June 1976. (Unpublished Internal Report.)
110 Supra note 10, at 500.

I11 The Prosecutor: An Inquiry into the Exercise of Discretion, supra note 50.
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established pattern of accommodations and concessions routinely exchanged
between Crown attorneys and "favoured" defence counsel. While Grosman's
trail-blazing study should not be under-estimated, it must nevertheless be
noted that his observations are based on impression and hearsay rather than
systematic research of the actual practices associated with plea bargaining.
Furthermore, some reviewers have contended strongly that his findings would
not necessarily be applicable to other jurisdictions in Canada."12 Since Grosman's work was avowedly "speculative," we cannot draw any conclusions
as to the true extent of plea bargaining in the jurisdiction studied; although
one prosecutor is cited as having estimated that about 20 percent of guilty
pleas before the Magistrates' Courts were the fruits of plea bargaining. 113
The first quantitative research into plea bargaining in Canada was conducted by Wynne and Hartnagel in a "prairie" city during the years 1972
and 1973.114 The researchers examined the files of all persons charged with
Criminal Code offences where there appeared to be "evidence" of plea bargaining between Crown and defence counsel. The "evidence" in question
consisted of the presence of all the following elements: the original charge
had been changed, a "not guilty" or reserved plea had been altered to a plea
of "guilty," and the file contained correspondence between Crown and defence counsel and/or written comments or notes indicating that the Crown
had reduced a charge in exchange for a guilty plea. Wynne and Hartnagel
scrutinized the data collected for evidence of the effects upon plea negotiation
of three legal factors: the defendant's criminal record, the presence of multiple and/or repetitive charges, and the nature of the offence. In addition,
they attempted to assess the impact upon plea negotiations of three extra-legal
factors: the defendant's race, his occupation, and whether he was represented
by counsel.
The authors conclude that, since the Crown's decision whether to
negotiate a plea is not affected by the accused's previous record, the experienced offender does not appear to have any particular advantage in the system
of negotiation. Furthermore, they discovered that, except in relation to native
Indians, the likelihood of plea bargaining is increased significantly by the
existence of multiple charges. Perhaps it is not surprising that they also concluded that bargaining was most likely to occur in relation to driving offences
involving alcohol. In general, the authors demonstrate that the likelihood of
bargaining varies considerably according to the type of offence. For example,
while bargaining was present in 27 percent of indictable offences, it was discovered that virtually no summary offences were the subject of negotiation." 5r
Another significant finding was that the "benefits" of plea bargaining were
restricted almost exclusively to those accused persons represented by counsel.
Finally, the researchers conclude that native Canadians do not experience
the same benefits of plea bargaining as do their white counterparts under
similar conditions.

112 Bowen-Coulthurst, Book Review (1970),

Grosman, supra note 50, at 32.
114 Supra note 12.
113

115 Id.

at 48.

20 U. Toronto L.J. 494 at 496.
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In a similar vein, John Hagan's study of the role played by legal, procedural and extra-legal factors in the sentencing process indicates that the
likelihood of plea bargaining is affected significantly by the existence of multiple charges.110 In sharp contrast to the findings of Wynne and Hartnagel,
however, Hagan concludes that the likelihood of plea negotiation, measured
simply by the presence of charge reduction, is not affected significantly by
the accused person's race. However, Hagan's study of 1,018 offenders, which
was undertaken in a "medium-sized western Canadian city," concludes that
the sentence that was ultimately imposed was primarily a reflection of the
seriousness of the initial charge and the defendant's prior record rather than
of such procedural variables as charge alteration and initial plea.
The only other study of plea bargaining in Canada is John Klein's recent
book, Let's Make A Deal."7 Klein's research was based on interviews with
115 inmates in a maximum security federal penitentiary. The author directed
his attention to the types of "deal" offenders had struck "in interaction with
agents in the criminal justice system to minimize the possible punitive consequences of (their illegal activities)." Klein discovered that 53 percent of
offenders claimed that they had been enmeshed in "deals" of various kinds. 11 8
Significantly, these alleged "deals" occurred primarily in the context of relationships between the offenders and the police, while only a minority of such
"deals" were the outcome of the involvement of Crown counsel. The bargains
allegedly struck involved such significant benefits to the offender as the dropping of charges against his accomplice, particularly where his partner happened to be his girlfriend or wife, the dropping of charges against the offender
himself, the facilitation of bail, and arrangements for the securing of a lenient
sentence. In exchange for these benefits, the police allegedly gained by the
recovery of such items as illegal explosives, firearms, stolen property, and
drugs. Furthermore, the police benefited in a more general sense because
they improved their clearance rates and, most importantly, they preserved the
flow of that life-blood of any police department-information. 119
The major shortcoming of all these studies is that the true nature and
extent of plea bargaining within any given Canadian jurisdiction cannot be
20
assessed accurately solely by means of inference from secondary sources.1
Specifically, all of the studies base their conclusions upon information gleaned
from official files and interviews. While such information is the source of
116 Supra note 12.

11 Supra note 12.
18 Id. at 132.
119 Id. at 123-28.
120 Id. at 21-123, generally. For example, the studies by Hartnagel, and Wynne and
Hartnagel probably underestimated the amount of plea bargaining. These researchers
only counted cases as "bargains" when there was evidence that the original charge had
been changed from "not guilty" or "reserved" to "guilty," and when there was evidence
from correspondence or written comments in files indicating that "deals" had been agreed
to. It seems reasonable to assume that not all, and probably only a few, bargains resulted
in such written notes and/or correspondence. Similarly, Hogarth's data probably represent
an underestimate of plea bargaining in that he refers only to the numbers of guilty pleas
among those convicted. On the other hand, Hagan's data are probably over-estimations
of the amount of plea bargaining because he uses the number of "charge reductions" as
his measure of plea bargaining.
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undeniably fruitful conclusions, it nevertheless must be considered in conjunction with research that is based on actual observation of the process ot
plea bargaining.' 21 Failure to observe the day-to-day interaction of Crown
and defence counsel merely results in a complete lack of clarity as to the true
nature of the various forms of relationships existing between these participants in the court process. It may be contended that any study that bases its
conclusions upon inference from official files or from interviews is necessarily
vulnerable to the possibility that the relationship between Crown and defence
counsel is portrayed in the light of the researcher's own a priori assumptions
rather than in the light of the complex and disparate types of interaction that
may be identified by close observation of the routine behaviour of defence
and prosecuting counsel. Significantly, none of the studies discussed attempts
to draw any distinction between true "bargains," tentative negotiations,
and mere discussions. It may well be, however, that this patent lack of clarity
renders any discussion of what is compendiously labelled as "plea bargaining"
or "plea negotiation" extremely hazardous-any attempt to formulate a
Canadian policy relating to "plea bargaining" can only be considered both
rash and premature.
In conclusion, while the few studies of plea bargaining that have been
undertaken in Canada have yielded invaluable information, the state of our
knowledge about the practice can still only be termed "embryonic." Until
empirical research clarifies the essential nature of the different types of interaction presently characterized by "plea bargaining," our knowledge will of
necessity continue to be both crude and vague. As Brian Grosman so aptly
described the situation in 1970, "we have yet to ask the crucial questions in
-2
order to discover under what conditions or situations discretion is exercised."'
V.

THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION AND THE ABOLITION OF
PLEA BARGAINING
As we have seen, the Law Reform Commission of Canada has recommended the complete abolition of prosecutorial plea bargaining. They suggest
that the goal may be achieved by the employment of two relatively simple
measures. 2 3 First, the Commission contends that prosecutorial plea bargaining should be abolished by administrative fiat; in other words, directives pro'hibiting the practice should be issued by the appropriate attorneys general to
all Crown counsel under their jurisdiction. Second, it is suggested that an
effective method of eliminating plea bargaining is judicial control; judges
should "use their influence" to discourage the practice. Although the Commission does not explain exactly how judges should exercise their influence
in specific cases, it appears that it supports the view of Ferguson and Roberts
121 To date, and to the best of our knowledge, no Canadian research is based upon
the actual observation of the plea bargaining process. Extremely little of even the American research into plea bargaining is based upon actual observation of the process. One
of the few exceptions is the work done by Buckle and Buckle, supra note 13. For a further discussion of the weaknesses of the empirical research into plea bargaining, see

Cousineau and Verdun-Jones, Evaluating Research into Plea Bargaining in Canada and

the United States: Pitfalls Facing the Policy-Makers (1979), 21 Can. J. of Criminology
293.
122
123

Grosman, supra note 42, at 502.
Working Paper No. 15, supra note 8, at 48.
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that plea bargaining may be eliminated by means of "a judicial pronouncement that any plea of guilty which was induced by a prosecutorial bargain is
involuntary and therefore invalid.' 24 Since the Law Reform Commission
does not distinguish between the various forms of relationships that may exist
between Crown and defence counsel in the pre-trial process, it is doubtful
whether these methods would achieve a high degree of success. As we have
seen, the term 'plea bargaining' covers such a variety of pre-trial relationships
(some of which may be proper and others that may be highly improper),
that a simple statement that plea bargaining must be eliminated is not only
ineffective, but highly confusing to criminal justice practitioners. It is curious
that the Law Reform Commission should settle upon these two methods of
implementing its abolitionist stance without considering other techniques
available for its purposes.
Ferguson and Roberts, for example, suggest three other techniques.
First, they propose a legislative pronouncement to the effect that plea bargaining is illegal and that any guilty pleas obtained as a result of the practice
would be invalidated.'!'- Second, they argue that ethical standards prohibiting
the practice should be enforced vigorously against those counsel who violate
them.1 2-61 Still, they do indicate their doubt as to the efficacy of this technique
in eliminating plea bargaining. 2" 7 Third, they suggest that an effective method
of suppressing the practice would be to eliminate the incentives to engage in
plea bargaining. For example, if it is true that plea bargaining is the outcome
of a shortage of court resources, it would be more rational to increase those
resources than to rely on the practice of plea bargaining. 128
124
125

ment.

Supra note 10, at 573.
Id. Presumably, the authors intend to refer to legislation of the Federal Parlia-

126 Id. This is also the view of the Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note
9, at 125.
127 Id. However, by itself, this method might not be too effective since lawyers,
like other professionals, would be slow to report the conduct of fellow lawyers, particularly if the conduct involved is not traditionally criminal. Many lawyers, if they were
to discover another lawyer bargaining, might easily rationalize that the conduct in
the circumstances of the particular case was not unethical, and therefore it would not
be reported.
128 In addition to providing more court resources, they suggest that case load pressure may be reduced further by ensuring that a reasonably high flow of guilty pleas will
be maintained by the introduction of systematic procedures for discovery in the criminal
process. Ferguson and Roberts, supra note 10, at 575-76:
Another important factor in removing the incentive to engage in plea bargaining
would be to recognize the lesson learned in other jurisdictions, that is, that a fair
and sensible charging process coupled with full discovery of the prosecution case
is successful in maintaining a reasonably high flow of guilty pleas.
Also see Hooper, Discovery in Criminal Cases (1972), 50 Can. B. Rev. 445; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Study Report: Discovery in Criminal Cases (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1974); and Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Procedure: Discovery, Working Paper No. 4 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974). In
response to the concerns raised by the work of the Law Reform Commission on discovery in criminal cases, there have been pilot projects requiring full disclosure of the
Crown's case in Montreal (see L.R.C.C., Fourth Annual Report, supra note 2, at 15)
and Vancouver (announced May 30th, 1977). The Attorney General of Ontario has
announced guidelines establishing a new system of disclosure in that province. See statement by Hon. R. R. McMurtry (1977), 37 C.R.N.S. 253; and Evans C.J.H.C.O., Notice
to the Profession (1977), 37 C.R.N.S. 255-59.
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There are still other techniques that may be employed in an attempt to
eliminate plea bargaining. One highly effective method is legislative reform.
For example, plea bargaining was alleged to have occurred on a widespread
basis when conviction for a second offence contrary to section 234 of the
Criminal Code (impaired driving) led to an automatic minimum prison sentence whereas a second conviction contrary to section 236(1) (driving with
more than 80 mg. of alcohol in the blood) did not lead to such a drastic
outcome. By providing for a minimum prison sentence for a second conviction
of both offences, Parliament effectively destroyed any opportunity to plea
bargain in relation to them. A further technique that may be considered is the
elimination of prosecutorial discretion in relation to serious offences. In
Germany, prosecutorial plea bargaining does not take place in relation to
serious offences because the prosecutor is under a legal duty to lay charges
in relation to such offences when there is sufficient evidence for him to do
so.' " Removing prosecutorial discretion as to the laying of charges is, of
course, contrary to Canadian legal traditions, but such a technique is an effective means of eliminating plea bargaining.
In addition to their failure to consider the variety of techniques available to the policy maker, the Law Reform Commission studiously avoids the
task of estimating the potential efficacy of the two techniques upon which
they have put their seal of approval. Furthermore, the Commission adopts an
extremely limited focus of inquiry throughout its discussion of plea bargaining. It mistakenly assumes that the abolition of plea bargaining will have an
impact only upon prosecutors and defence counsel, and steadfastly refuses to
consider the effects of adopting their policy throughout the entire Canadian
criminal justice system. Recent empirical research published in the United
States suggests that the blinkered approach of the Law Reform Commission
is not only misguided, but also promises to open a Pandora's box of undesirable effects that may be considered equally (if not more) objectionable than
the practice that the Commission has set out to eliminate.
One study that documents the proposition that the abolition of plea
bargaining cannot be considered except in relation to the entire criminal
justice system is Thomas Church's article, Plea Bargains, Concessions and
130
the Courts: Analysis of a Quasi-Experiment.
Church examined the conse-

quences for an entire judicial system of an attempt to abolish plea bargaining

129 See Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge: State

University Press, 1969) at 191-95; Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany (1970), 18 Crim. J. Comp. L. 508; Langbein, Controlling ProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany (1974), 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439; and Herr-

mann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of ProsecutorialDiscretion
in Germany (1974), 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 468. Also see Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Trials (1970), 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 483.
130 Supra note 13, at 377. His study is of a suburban county criminal justice system

considered to be very much unlike those found in major urban centres that display the
worst "pathologies" of criminal justice. The court system is double-tiered, consisting of
municipal and district courts, and a circuit court. This criminal justice system is well
financed, with high salaries for employees, ample office facilities, and adequate staff who
display high levels of morale and professionalism.
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by the introduction of a policy that outlawed the reduction of charges in
drug trafficking. 131 This policy was enforced rigorously by the chief prosecutor. Before the introduction of this new policy, the most common method
of dealing with drug sale cases was the negotiation of a guilty plea by the
prosecuting and defence attorneys. The charges were usually reduced from
"delivery of a controlled substance" to "attempted sale" or "possession" in
exchange for a guilty plea." -2 Church suggests that this system initially produced a tendency for prosecutors to "over-charge" in such cases.
A salient feature of this system was judicial abstention from the actual
process of negotiating agreements; indeed, Church contends that there was
considerable evidence that many judges regarded judicial involvement in
such practices as being highly improper and repugnant. Nevertheless, the
courts typically ratified the agreements reached by the prosecutor and defence
attorneys.
After the new policy was implemented, there was a significant change in
the method of disposing of trafficking cases: the practice of pleading guilty
to a reduced charge was eliminated almost completely, the percentage of
cases coming to trial increased, and there was a considerable decrease in the
total proportion of cases decided by means of the guilty plea. These findings,
however, should not obscure the fact that, even after the policy change, as
many as 75 percent of the defendants entered a plea of guilty to the original
charge-despite the prospect of a maximum sentence of twenty years. 13
Clearly, the willingness of defendants to plead guilty to such a serious charge
requires some explanation. In Church's view, the key to such an explanation
may be found in the new patterns of bargaining that emerged.
The most remarkable consequence of implementing the new policy was
that, despite the widespread agreement among judges that judicial participation in the process of plea bargaining was highly improper, a significant
number of them found themselves becoming increasingly-albeit reluctantly
-involved in the practice of negotiating sentences. This judicial involvement

131 Church's study attempted to determine the impact of the abolition of plea
bargaining upon several components of a judicial system. Many studies, however, are
very narrow in focus. For example, a study in Oregon resulted in "impressionistic interpretations" of very little data. See Hass, High Impact Project Underway in Oregon: No
Plea Bargaining, Robbery and Burglary (1974), 10 Prosecutor 127-28. Another study
of the effects of abolishing plea bargaining found that the rates of p!ea bargaining were
indeed lower following a ban on it. See Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargaining
in Black Hawk County: A Case Study, supra note 13, at 1053-71. A third study attempted to determine the consequences of a ban on plea bargaining on trial and guilty
plea rates. See Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, supra note 13, at 621-24.
These studies do not provide an adequate basis for reasoned conclusions about the consequences of the curtailment or elimination of plea bargaining. While each study suffers
from its own limitations, such as short time spans, the most common limitation is that
they are narrowly conceived. The stated possibility that changes in plea bargaining practices may or may not affect one or two aspects of a criminal justice system provides no
real assessment of the overall consequences of such changes.
132 Church, supra note 13, at 379.
133 id. at 383-84.
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in the bargaining process assumed a considerable variety of forms, and it is
interesting to note that Church found that those judges who resisted this trend
towards involvement in the negotiation of sentences encountered considerable
"docket problems." The evidence indicates that after the "no plea bargain"
policy was implemented, the trial rate soared, but it increased primarily for
those judges who would not become involved in the sentence negotiation
practices. Quite clearly, then, the elimination of prosecutorial plea bargaining
-far from achieving the goals mirrored in the new policy-merely displaced
the arena in which the practice occurred. As a consequence, many of the
judges became reluctant partners in the process of negotiating sentences.
The introduction of the new policy also stimulated significant change in
the practices of prosecutors. The incidence of nolle prosequi and dismissal
of charges increased by about one third, and this remarkable trend was reflected in a sharp decline in the overall conviction rate. Confronted by this
decline, the police responded both by improving their charging practices and
by reducing the total number of warrants issued. Nevertheless, during this
initial change-over period, prosecutors actually increased their dismissal rate
in spite of the improved preparation of cases by the police. It may be contended perhaps that the reduction in the number of discretionary options
available to the prosecutors merely produced a situation in which increased
reliance was placed on the one drastic option that they were still empowered
to employ. Since an improvement in police charging practices normally might
be expected to decrease the dismissal rate, the discovery of a directly contrary trend raises serious questions about the wisdom of the new policy outlawing plea bargaining.
While Church by no means investigates all of the possible consequences
for the criminal justice system of abolishing plea bargaining, his research
nevertheless conveys a salutary warning to those commentators who blithely
assume that the abolition of the practice necessarily will have only "beneficial" effects in terms of their own value system. It might be suggested that
if abolition of plea bargaining at the prosecutorial level of the justice system
leads both to sentencing negotiations at the judicial level, and to greatly increased rates of dismissal at the prosecutorial level (despite improved case
preparation by the police), then the "cure" may be somewhat worse
than the perceived "disease." Of course, it may well be argued that there is
nothing inherently unconscionable about sentence negotiation with the judiciary. Nevertheless, although there are no doubt a number of people who
would support such a practice, it must be emphasized that the Law Reform
Commission itself has, as we have seen, steadfastly refused to recognize that
justice may be "purchased at the bargaining table." In other words, the
Commission has failed to advert to those consequences of its proposed reform
that clearly contravene its own value system. Indeed, it is precisely this type
of short-sighted analysis that the present authors feel vitiates the Commission's basic approach and its conclusions.
While Church's findings are highly dramatic, published research from
other sources indicates that his emphasis upon the need to study plea bargaining within the context of the total justice system is by no means misplaced.
For example, H. Joo Shin contends that concessions extracted from the pro-
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secutor may well be neutralized by subsequent adjustments made during the
parole process." 4 If Shin's comments are valid, it once again becomes clear
that discussion of plea bargaining without advertence to the system-wide implications of the practice amounts to sheer intellectual folly.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA
AND "DIVERSIONARY BARGAINING"

Ironically, the Law Reform Commission's approach to the question of
plea bargaining indicates not only a failure to consider the practice within
the context of the total justice system, but also an apparent inability to relate
its views on plea bargaining to its published stance on other issues in criminal
justice.'-- For example, the Commission blithely ignores the potential for
prosecutorial bargaining that is clearly inherent in the process of pre-trial
settlement or diversion-a practice that it has enthusiastically espoused. 36
Essentially, the Commission's proposals in relation to pre-trial settlement
place an accused person in the position of making a choice between the uncertainties of the trial process and the present advantage of freedom from
prosecution, provided he or she agrees to make restitution or compensation
to the alleged victim, or similar amends.' 3 7 The coercive undertones to such
a system of diversion have been articulated dramatically by Norval Morris:
A student with prosecutorial experience put it aphoristically, if exaggeratedly,
to me: "The guilty we convict; the innocent we divert and supervise." Such is
the coercive threat of trial, the pain of detention, the delays, the fears and

134 Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole
Proce.sses (1973), 1 J. Crim. Justice 27. Two studies of Parole Board decision-making
in Canada have been published recently. However, neither of these works discusses
the extent (if any) to which Board members consider the effects of plea bargaining
upon the inmate's sentence. See Carri&re and Silverstone, The Parole Process: A
Study of the National Parole Board (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1976). For an excellent discussion of the problems facing reformers in "a criminal justice
system of diverse locations of sentencing power," see Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive"
Sentencing (1978), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 550.
13G McNaughton-Smith, Permission to be Slightly Free: A Study of the Granting,
Refusing and Withdrawing of Parole in Canadian Penitentiaries (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1976). Hagan argues that, within a Canadian context, "considerations won in early stages of the legal process may ultimately prove illusionary"
largely because of the broad scope of the sentencing power exercised by the Canadian
trial judge. See Hagan, supra note 12, at 544. Also see Solicitor General of Canada,
Diversion: A Canadian Concept and Practice; A Report on the First National Conferetnce on Diversion October 23-26, 1977. Quebec City (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1978).
136 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Dispositions and Sentences
in the Criminal Process: Guidelines (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976); Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Studies on Diversion (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975);
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Diversion, Working Paper No. 7 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
137 Diversion, Working Paper No. 7, id., at 8-12. It is important to note that in a
pre-trial settlement (as opposed to "community absorption" or policy "screening"), the
Commission recommends that a charge should have been laid previously (at 15-16).
Also see Nejelski, Diversion: The Promise and the Danger (1976), 22 Crime & Delinquency 393.
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uncertainties of punishment, that diversionary processes prove compelling for
all but the most determinedly innocent or the most experienced in crime. 188

It is true that the Commission stresses the need for procedural fairness and

public scrutiny of the process. 139 However, pre-trial settlement is par excel-

lence a form of "negotiated justice," and it would be most enlightening to
discover why "diversionary bargaining" is regarded as a practice to be encouraged while the more traditional plea bargaining is a practice to be
treated with moral outrage. The real objection to the Commission's approach
is that it wrests the process of negotiation away from the ultimate control
of the trial judge. In the United States, the trend has been towards ensuring

procedural fairness in negotiated justice by requiring that all negotiated dispositions be presented to the trial judge for ratification or rejection. At this
stage of the process, the judge has the opportunity to ensure that the interests
of the public, the offender, and the victim are protected adequately. One does
not have to be unduly cynical to suggest that the Commission's proposal io
leave control of the process in the hands of Crown counsel is considerably

less satisfactory than the American legislation, which establishes an impartial
judge as the ultimate arbiter of the bargaining process. 140

138 Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974) at 10-11. In a recent case in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Anderson J.
rejected an important component of the L.R.C.C. scheme when he ruled that the Crown
may not proceed with any charges once a diversion agreement has been reached:
[Tihe prosecutor held the threat of criminal proceedings over the head of the
respondent, in order to induce her to enter into and carry out wishes of the prosecutor.
The Crown cannot usurp the function of the courts in this way. The courts
and only the courts have the right to impose sentence and the Crown cannot
create an administrative program, inherently coercive in nature, whereby the
accused accepts "diversion" on terms fixed by the prosecutor, subject to control
by the prosecutor, who retains the discretion to revive the criminal proceedings if
the accused fails to adhere to the terms fixed by the prosecutor. The prosecutor
is an officer of the court and he cannot use his office or his discretion to invade
the exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary. He cannot thwart the rule of law in
this way.
See R. i,. Jones, [1978] 3 W.W.R. 271 at 283, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 173 at 183 (B.C.S.C.).
139 Diversion, Working Paper No. 7, supra note 136, at 14-22.
140 It must be emphasized that the authors do not disapprove of negotiations as a
means of resolving all disputes presently entering the court system. On the other hand, it
is contended strongly that the parties themselves should not, through prosecuting and
defence counsel, always have the final say in fashioning diversion agreements. Only a
party who is removed from the actual process of negotiation can determine properly
whether a diversion agreement satisfactorily represents the interests of the public, the
victim and the alleged offender.

